

28 January 1964

Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Joe:

The following message has just been received from []

[] our half of the PI team we sent to Saigon):

"1. Have discussed problem of total photo coverage of SVN by U-2s with COS, J-2 MACV, and General Weede, C/S, MACV. After explanation of what is intended and potential uses such base line coverage have encountered very favorable reaction. General Youngdale, J-2 MACV, indicated 'enthusiastic' desire for such coverage. General Weede stated MACV fully supports project.

"2. Ambassador has been informed of desire for his views but has asked for formal briefing on the recent Cambodia-Laos border area photography and other Tango photography before making decision. [] has prepared good briefing of such material and will present same to Ambassador and other cleared persons at 0300Z on 30 January.

"3. Our preliminary view is that neither U. S. nor SVN elements here can handle total film take involved. They can handle and will have need for selected duplicates and prints. Full nature MACV requirements not yet developed, but there is great interest in complete inventory of strategic hamlets with annotations concerning exact location, size, defense, evidence of activity, etc. Our view is that this could be produced as machine listing by NPIC sorted by province, district, etc. J-2 MACV is developing other ideas concerning questions to be answered in IPIR.

DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.

COPY 2

X1 "4. Please inform General Carroll briefings here proceeding satisfactorily. [redacted] asked that you also inform General Carroll of substance paras 1 - 3."

Faithfully yours,

/s/

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

MSC:Bec

Orig (cy 1) - Adse (by hand)
Cy 2 - DDCI
Cy 3 - ER (via Exec Dir)
Cy 4 - DD/P (EYES ONLY)
Cy 5 - DD/I (EYES ONLY)
Cy 6 - C/FE (EYES ONLY)
Cy 7 - O/DDCI (Mr. Knoche)
Cy 8 - O/DCI (Mr. Elder)

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SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	EA/Acting DCI 1/22		
2	EA/DCI		
3	ExDir-f0r follow up		
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

Remarks:

This has gone to DD/P for
[redacted] action; to Security
and the Office of Operations for information.

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FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE
O/ExecDirector	22 Jan 64

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1 November 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

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1. In connection with a number of papers which are being prepared at the White House on various crises during the Johnson Administration, sometime during the week beginning 28 October [] received a call from John Foster at the White House asking for "minutes" of the meeting on Cyprus at the White House on Sunday, 26 January 1964. Apparently there is no written record of this meeting either at the White House or the Department of State.

2. After appropriate consultation here [] told Mr. Foster that we had no minutes of the meeting. He added that we had a note in our file which indicated that General Carter attended the meeting as the Agency's representative and listed some of the people who were present but that we had nothing which could be described as minutes.

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3. Peter Jessup later called [] who took the same position. Peter then approached the Director, who confirmed that we did not desire to send General Carter's memorandum regarding the meeting to the White House but did authorize Peter to read it in my office and to make whatever notes he desired. Peter did this today in my presence. He took nothing with him except his handwritten notes.

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
L. K. White

Executive Director - Comptroller

Attachment

Memo dtd 28 Jan 64 by A-DCI, subj:
Meeting on Cyprus at the White House
on Sunday, 26 January 1964

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DRAFT

Amembassy LONDON
Amembassy PARIS
Amembassy ATHENS
Amembassy NICOSIA
Amembassy ANKARA
USUN NEW YORK
Amembassy BONN
Amembassy BRUSSELS
Amembassy ROME
CINCSSTRIKE/CINCMEDAFSA FOR POLAD
CINCEUR
USDOCOSOUTH FOR BURRIS
PARIS ALSO FOR USRO, BURNS AND JAMES
Amembassy TOKYO TOSEC

IMMEDIATE
ALL
ADDRESSES

CYPRUS

FOR AMBASSADOR BRUCE

Inform HMG as follows:

A. In light deteriorating situation Cyprus, firm HMG decision that it unable continue carry responsibility alone and critical need to prevent military clash between two NATO allies, USG has reached following decisions on understandings indicated paragraph B:

1. US will support British proposal for allied peace-keeping force in Cyprus.
2. USG will contribute troop contingent, airlift and logistic support.
3. USG will urge Greece and Turkey to support establishment of this force.
4. USG will approach selected other NATO countries

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to secure their participation.

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B. Understandings on which USG decision to take part are based follow:

1. Allied force will be established in Cyprus temporarily and will remain for shortest possible time during which intensified efforts will be pursued to secure agreement of parties to a political settlement.

2. Greece and Turkey as well as UK will support establishment of force.

3. Three guarantor powers will secure agreement of Makarios and Kutchuk to establishment of force. US will support if desirable approaches to Makarios and Kutchuk.

4. While the force will be drawn from NATO countries its establishment will not be a NATO operation.

5. The allied force will augment British forces engaged in keeping law and order on the island in response to Makarios' request of December 23 (?), 1963. The force would act as the agency of the Guarantor powers under the treaty of guarantee. It will operate under British command.

6. Total strength of about 10,000 men is contemplated including about 2,700 British combat troops now on island. The UK will make an additional contribution of

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combat forces equivalent in strength to the US contingent. The US is prepared to provide up to 3 battalions totaling approximately 2,000 men in ground troops.

Contributions should be obtained from as many other allied countries as possible. At least 2 other significant contributions are needed. For illustrative purposes this might result in a force consisting of UK 4,700; US 2,000; Italy 1,000; Germany 1,000; and Belgium, Netherlands or Canada 500. Every effort would be made to obtain contributions from the largest possible number of allied countries which could result in a reduction in the requirement for US ground troops.

7. US is also prepared to provide airlift and other logistic support.

8. The US will approach Turkey and Greece as soon as confirmation is received of British concurrence in this paper. Because of the urgency of the situation these approaches should be made January 27. The special difficulties with Turkey are recognized. The US would plan to say that it is involving itself in the Cyprus problem in response to Turkey's urgings and despite its world-wide commitments in other critical areas. It is essential that in return Turkey refrain from any precipitate military or political action.

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9. Immediately after Greece and Turkey have agreed to the force and the three guarantor powers have secured Makarios' agreement, approaches would be made in allied capitals. UK would take the initiative and the US would follow promptly.

10. Rules of engagement to be agreed. It is hoped that those governing the present British forces would be found to be satisfactory.


C. Related Moves

1. The US and UK would promptly inform the NATO Council but not ask NATO to involve itself.

2. Every effort should be made to avoid this problem going to UN. USUN and UKUN would concert in New York to this end and about informing Secretary General and other UN organs.

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24 January 1964

The Honorable Roswell L. Gilpatric
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

This note sends you my very best wishes for the future and my congratulations on an outstanding record of public service.

You will be sorely missed by all of us but I assure you that the Agency will continue the high degree of partnership with your successor that you know existed with you.

Faithfully yours,

/s/Pat

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA

Distribution:

Original - Addressee

1 - DDCI

1 - ER

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DDCI

64-502/A

21 January 1964

Major General Alva R. Fitch
Deputy Director
Defense Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20301

Dear Alva:

I share your concern about never being completely confident that you knew all about the CIA that you ought to know -- when you find it out, please tell me too!!

Seriously, I know of no clearances that we have over here that are over and above what you had as a member of USIB but we would certainly be pleased to brief you on any and all of our activities at any time. As you know, we are establishing a two-day Project "USEFUL" exercise for what we hope to be your senior subordinates and some of the JCS staff, but I know you have neither the time nor the inclination nor the need for that type of briefing.

I suggest, therefore, that we get together over here for a couple of hours either before or after lunch, but to include lunch, and we will tell you what we are doing and why. I would have Lyman Kirkpatrick do the hard work but I would want to sit in too because I learn something new every time. It might be helpful if John Bross sat in too.

How would Monday, the 27th, or Tuesday, the 28th, be?

In the meantime, if there is anything specific about any part of our operations that you want the word of Isaiah on, please give a phone call. JAN 35 11 02 AM '64


Faithfully yours,

/s/ Pat

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301



6 January 1964

Lieutenant General Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
2430 E Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.

Dear Pat:

You may by now be aware that I have moved over into Bill Quinn's old chair and am attempting to fill his oversize shoes in a very diffident manner. Although I have been around the Washington intelligence community for several years, I have never been completely confident that I knew all about the CIA that I ought to.


So -- if I'm now eligible for any higher level of clearances, or in your eyes have an expanded need-to-know, or if anything important has happened since I was last briefed, or for any other reason you would like to fill me in, please feel free to do so. I shall make every effort to adjust my schedule to your convenience.

Sincerely yours,
(after 1 March Faithfully yours)

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Alva".

ALVA R. FITCH
Major General, USA
Deputy Director

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21 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. On 20 January Congressman Robert Sikes of Florida called me [redacted]

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[redacted]

2. I told Congressman Sikes that I would check on what we have already done. I said I believed that we have had correspondence about this matter, that I was not sure it was with him, but that it was with people on the Hill who are interested in that area so I presumed it was with him. Mr. Sikes asked that I look into the matter and call him.

[redacted]
Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

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MSC:blp

Distribution:

- ✓ Original - DDCI
- 1 - General Counsel
- 1 - EA/DCI
- 1 - ER

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[redacted]

NOTE: General Carter called Alma D. Butler, Administrative Assistant to Congressman Sikes, on 21 January and told her that Larry Houston has the action on this matter and would be in touch with Congressman Sikes. Mr. Houston was advised of this on 22 January -- he is to follow up and close out the matter and let General Carter know when it is over.

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BLP (22 Jan)

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Attached is a memo for the record of your conversation with Congressman Sikes; background memoranda on this same subject are also attached.

As you can see, this all started last July when we had a similar query from Congressman Sikes. At that time it was determined that CIA was not involved in any problems regarding [redacted] 25X1

25X1 [redacted]
[redacted] to recontact the Department of Defense to see if there has been any change in their dealings with Mr. Sikes that would bring about this present query. [redacted] will let us know when he hears. 25X1

25X1 [redacted] said it was his understanding as a result of your conversation with him last night that you were planning to call Congressman Sikes back today and tell him that Mr. Houston is out of town (he'll be back at work tomorrow) but would be in contact with Mr. Sikes upon his return.

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